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Abstract: Distributed Collaborative Editors (DCE) provide computer support for modifying si-
multaneously shared documents, such as articles, wiki pages and programming source code, by
dispersed users. Controlling access in such systems is still a challenging problem, as they need
dynamic access changes and low latency access to shared documents. In this paper, we propose a
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) based on replicating the shared document and its authorization
policy at the local memory of each user. To deal with latency and dynamic access changes, we use
an optimistic access control technique where enforcement of authorizations is retroactive. We show
that naive coordination between updates of both copies can create security hole on the shared docu-
ment by permitting illegal modification, or rejecting legal modification. Finally, we present a novel
framework for managing authorizations in collaborative editing work which may be deployed easily
on P2P networks.
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Mode`le Optimiste de Controˆle d’Acce`s Obligatoire pour les
Editeurs Collaboratifs
Re´sume´ : Les e´diteurs collaboratifs fournissent un support logiciel pour la modification simultane´e
des documents partage´s, comme des articles, des pages wiki et du code source des programmes,
par des utilisateurs disperse´s ge´ographiquement. Le controˆle d’acce`s dans de tels syste`mes demeure
toujours un challenge difficile, car ils ne´cessitent des acce`s dynamiques ainsi qu’une faible latence
pour acce´der aux documents partage´s. Dans ce rapport, nous proposons un controˆle d’acce`s
obligatoire qui se base sur la re´plication du document partage´ ainsi que sa politique d’acce`s.
Pour traiter des proble`mes de la latence et les acce`s dynamiques, nous utilisons une technique
de controˆle d’acce`s optimiste ou` l’exe´cution des autorisations est re´troactive. Nous montrons
qu’une coordination naı¨ve entre les mises a` jour des deux copies peut causer des failles de se´curite´
en permettant des modifications ille´gales ou en rejetant des modifications le´gales. Enfin, nous
pre´sentons un nouvel environnement pour la gestion des autorisations dans des e´diteurs collaboratifs
qui peut eˆtre facilement de´ploye´ sur des re´seaux P2P.
Mots-cle´s : Controˆle d’acce`s, Re´plication Optimiste, Editeurs Collaboratifs.
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1 Introduction
Distributed Collaborative Editors (DCE) belong to a particular class of distributed systems that en-
ables several and dispersed users to form a group for editing documents (e.g. Google Docs). To
ensure data availability, the shared documents are replicated on the site of each participating user.
Each user modifies locally his copy and then sends this update to other users.
DCE are distributed systems that have to consider human interactions. So, they are characterised
by the following requirements: (i) High local responsiveness: the system has to be as responsive as
its single-user editors [3, 15, 16]; (ii) High concurrency: the users must be able to concurrently and
freely modify any part of the shared document at any time [3, 15]; (iii) Consistency: the users must
eventually see a converged view of all copies [3,15] in order to support WYSIWIS (What You See Is
What I See) principle; (iv) Decentralized coordination: all concurrent updates must be synchronized
in decentralized fashion in order to avoid a single point of failure; (v) Scalability: a group must be
dynamic in the sense that users may join or leave the group at any time.
Motivations. One of the most challenging problem in DCE is balancing the computing goals of
collaboration and access control to shared information [17]. Indeed interaction in collaborative
editors is aimed at making shared document available to all who need it, whereas access control
seeks to ensure this availability only to users with proper authorization. Moreover, the requirements
of DCE include high responsiveness of local updates. However, when adding an access control layer,
high responsiveness is lost because every update must be granted by some authorization coming
from a distant user (as a central server). The major problem of latency in access control-based
collaborative editors is due to using one shared data-structure containing access rights that is stored
on a central server. So controlling access consists in locking this data-structure and verifying whether
this access is valid. Furthermore, unlike traditional single-user models, collaborative applications
have to allow for dynamic change of access rights, as users can join and leave the group in an ad-hoc
manner.
Contributions. To overcome the latency problem, we propose to replicate the access data-structure
on every site. Thus, a user will own two copies: the shared document and the access data-structure.
It is clear that this replication enable users to gain performance since when they want to manipulate
(read or update) the shared document, this manipulation will be granted or denied by controlling
only the local copy of the access data-structure. As DCE have to allow for dynamic change of access
rights, it is possible to achieve this goal when duplicating access rights. To do that, we propose a
Mandatory Access Control model (MAC) [11], in the sense that only one user, called administrator,
can modify the shared access data-structure. Thus, updates locally generated by the administrator
are then broadcast to other users. We choose dynamic access changes initiated by one user in order
to avoid the occurrence and the resolution of conflict changes.
The shared document’s updates and the access data-structure’s updates are applied in different
orders at different user sites. The absence of safe coordination between these different updates may
cause security holes (i.e. permitting illegal updates or rejecting legal updates on the shared docu-
ment). Inspired by the optimistic security concept introduced in [8], we propose an optimistic ap-
proach that tolerates momentary violation of access rights but then ensures the copies to be restored
in valid states with respect to the stabilized access control policy.
INRIA
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Outline of the paper. This paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses related work. Section
III presents the ingredients of our collaboration model. In Section IV, we investigate the issues raised
by replicating the shared document and its access data-structure. Section V presents our concurrency
control algorithm for managing MAC-based collaborative editing sessions. Section VI describes our
prototype and its evaluation on experiments. Section VII summarizes our contributions and sketch
future works.
2 Related Works
A survey on access control for collaborative systems can be found in [17]. We only recall some
representative approaches and their shortcomings. A collaborative environment has to manage the
frequent changing of access rights by users. Access Control Lists (ACL) and Capability Lists (CL)
cannot support very well dynamic change of permissions. Hence, the administrator of collaborative
environments often sets stricter permissions, as multiple users with varying levels of privileges will
try to access shared resources [13]. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [12] overcomes some
problems with dynamic change of rights. RBAC has the notion of a session which is a per-user
abstraction [5]. However, the ”session” concept also prevents a dynamic reassignment of roles since
the user roles cannot be changed within a single session. Users have to authenticate again to obtain
new roles. Spatial Access Control (SAC) has been proposed to solve this problem of role migration
within a session [2]. Instead of splitting users into groups as in RBAC, SAC divides the collaborative
environment into abstract spaces. However, SAC implementation needs prior knowledge of the
practice used in some collaborative system, in order to produce a set of rules that are generic enough
to match most of the daily access patterns. Every access needs to check the underlying access data-
structures; this requires locking data-structures and reduces collaborative work performance.
The majority of works on replicating authorization policies appears in database area [10, 1, 18].
For maintaining authorization consistency, these works generally rely on concurrency control tech-
niques that are suitable for database systems. As outlined in [3], these techniques are inappropriate
for DCE. Nevertheless, [10] is related to our work as it employs an optimistic approach. Indeed,
changes in authorizations can arrive in different order at different sites. Unlike our MAC approach,
conflict authorizations may appear as updates are initiated by several sites.
3 Our Collaboration Model
We give here the ingredients of our model.
3.1 Shared Data Object
It is known that collaborative editors manipulate share objects that admit a linear structure [3,14,16].
This structure can be modelled by the list abstract data type. The type of the list elements is a
parameter that can be instantiated by each needed type. For instance, an element may be regarded
as a character, a paragraph, a page, an XML node, etc. In [16], it has been shown that this linear
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structure can be easily extended to a range of multimedia documents, such as MicroSoft Word© and
PowerPoint© documents.
Definition 3.1 [Cooperative Operations]. The shared document state can be altered by the follow-
ing set of cooperative operations: (i) Ins(p,e) where p is the insertion position, e the element to be
added at position p; (ii) Del(p,e) which deletes the element e at position p; (iii) U p(p,e,e′) which
replaces the element e at position p by the new element e′. 
It is clear that combinations of these operations enable us to define more complex ones, such as
cut/copy and paste, that are intensively used in professional text editors.
3.2 Shared Policy Object
We consider an access control model based on authorization policies. An authorization policy spec-
ifies the operations a user can execute on a shared document. Three sets are used for specifying
authorization policies, namely:
1. S is the set of subjects. A subject can be a user or a group of users.
2. O is the set of objects. An object can be the whole shared document, an element or a group of
elements of this shared document.
3. R is the set of access rights. Each right is associated with an operation that user can perform
on shared document. Thus, we consider the right of reading an element (rR), inserting an
element (iR), deleting an element (rD) and updating an element (rU).
Definition 3.2 [Policy]. A policy is a function that maps a set of subjects and a set of objects to a set
of signed rights. We denote this function by P : P (S)×P (O)→ P (R)×{+,−}, where P (S), P (O)
and P (R) are the power sets of subjects, objects and rights respectively. The sign “+” represents a
right attribution and the sign “−” represents a right revocation. 
We represent a policy P as an indexed list of authorizations. Each authorization Pi is a quadruple
〈Si,Oi,Ri,ωi〉 where Si ⊆ S, Oi ⊆ O, Ri ⊆ R and ωi ∈ {−,+}. An authorization is said positive
(resp. negative) when ω = + (resp. ω = −). Negative authorizations are just used to accelerate the
checking process. We use a first-match semantics: when an operation o is generated, the system
checks o against its authorizations one by one, starting from the first authorization and stopping
when it reaches the first authorization l that matches o. If no matching authorizations are found, o is
rejected.
Definition 3.3 [Administrative Operations]. The state of a policy is represented by a triple 〈P,S,O〉
where P is the list of authorizations. The administrator can alter the state policy by the following set
of administrative operations: (i) AddUser/DelUser to add/remove a user in S; (ii) AddOb j/DelOb j
to add/remove an object in O; (iii) AddAuth(p, l)/DelAuth(p, l) to add/remove authorization l at
position p. An administrative operation r is called restrictive iff r = AddAuth(p, l) and l is negative
or r = DelAuth(p, l). 
INRIA
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3.3 Collaboration Protocol
In our collaboration protocol, we consider that a user maintains two copies: the shared document
and its access policy object. Each group consists of one administrator and several users. Only
administrator can specify authorizations in the policy object. It can also modify directly the shared
documents. As for users, they only modify the shared document with respect to the local policy
object. Our collaboration protocol proceeds as follows:
1. When a user manipulates the local copy of the shared document by generating a cooperative
operation, this operation will be granted or denied by only checking the local copy of the
policy object.
2. Once granted and executed, the local operations are then broadcast to the other users. A user
has to check whether or not the remote operations are authorized by its local policy object
before executing them.
3. When an administrator modifies its local policy object by adding or removing authorizations,
he sends these modifications to the other users in order to update their local copies. Note that
the administrator site does not coordinate concurrent cooperative operations.
We assume that messages are sent via secure and reliable communication network, and users are
identified and authenticated by the administrator in order to associate correctly access to these users.
4 Consistency and Security Issues
The replication of the shared document and the policy object is twofold beneficial: firstly it ensures
the availability of the shared document, and secondly it allows for flexibility in access rights check-
ing. However, this replication may create violation of access rights which may fail to meet one of
the most important requirements of DEC, the consistency of the shared document’s copies. Indeed,
the cooperative and administrative operations are performed in different orders on different copies
of the shared document and the policy object.
In the following, we investigate the issues raised by the use of the collaboration protocol de-
scribed in Section 3.3 and we informally present our solutions to address these issues.
4.1 Out-of-order Execution of Cooperative Operations
What happens if cooperative operations arrive in arbitrary orders even with stable policy object?
Consider the scenario in Figure 1.(a) where two users work on a shared document represented by
a sequence of characters and they have the same policy object (they are authorized to insert and
delete characters). These characters are addressed from 1 to the end of the document. Initially, both
copies hold the string “efecte”. User 1 executes operation o1 = Ins(2, f ) to insert the character ‘f’
at position 2. Concurrently, user 2 performs o2 = Del(6,e) to delete the character ‘e’ at position 6.
When o1 is received and executed on site 2, it produces the expected string “effect”. But, at site 1, o2
does not take into account that op1 has been executed before it and it produces the string “effece”.
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The result at site 1 is different from the result of site 2 and it apparently violates the intention of o2
since the last character ‘e’, which was intended to be deleted, is still present in the final string.
site 1
“efecte”
site 2
“efecte”
o1 = Ins(2, f )
&&L
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
o2 = Del(6,e)
rr
rr
r
yyrr
rr
r“effecte” “efect”
Del(6,e) Ins(2, f )
“effece” “effect”
(a) Incorrect integration.
site 1
“efecte”
site 2
“efecte”
o1 = Ins(2, f )
''PP
PPP
PP
PPP
PPP
o2 = Del(6,e)
nnn
nnn
wwnnn
nnn“effecte” “efect”
IT (o2,o1) = Del(7,e) Ins(2, f )
“effect” “effect”
(a) Correct integration.
Figure 1: Serialization of concurrent cooperative operations
To maintain consistency of the shared document, even though the policy object remains un-
changed, we use the Operational Transformation (OT) approach which has been proposed in [3].
In general, it consists of application-dependent transformation algorithm, called IT , such that for
every possible pair of concurrent operations, the application programmer has to specify how to in-
tegrate these operations regardless of reception order. In Figure 1.(b), we illustrate the effect of IT
on the previous example. At site 1, o2 needs to be transformed in order to include the effects of o1:
o′2 = IT ((Del(6,e), Ins(2, f )) = Del(7,e). The deletion position of o2 is incremented because o1
has inserted a character at position 1, which is before the character deleted by o2. It should be noted
that OT enables us to ensure the consistency for any number of concurrent operations which can be
executed in arbitrary order [9, 7] (i.e. no global order is necessary).
For managing collaborative editing work in a decentralized and scalable fashion, we reuse an
OT-based framework that is not presented here due to space limit. For more details see e.g. [4]. Our
objective here is to develop on the top of this framework a security layer for controlling access to the
shared documents.
4.2 Out-of-order Execution of Cooperative and Administrative Operations
Performing cooperative and administrative operations in different orders at every user site may in-
evitably lead to security holes. To underline these issues we will present in the following three
scenarios.
First scenario: Consider a group composed of an administrator adm and two standard users s1 and
s2. Initially, the three sites have the same shared document “abc” and the same policy object where
s1 is authorized to insert characters (see Figure 2). Suppose that adm revokes the insertion right of s1
and sends this administrative operation to s1 and s2 so that it is applied on their local policy copies.
Concurrently s1 executes a cooperative operation Ins(1,x) to derive the state “xabc” as it is granted
by its local policy. When adm receives the s1’s operation, it will be ignored (as it is not granted
INRIA
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by the adm’s local policy) and then the final state still remain “abc”. As s2 receives the s1’s insert
operation before its revocation, he gets the state “xabc” that will be unchanged even after having
executed the revocation operation. We are in presence of data inconsistency (the state of adm is
different from the state of s1 and s2) even though the policy object is same in all sites.
adm
“abc”
s1
“abc”
s2
“abc”
revoke insertion
right to s1
:
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
::
:
%%L
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
L
Ins(1,x)
((RR
RRR
RRR
R
{{xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
x
“xabc” Accepted
Ignored “xabc”
revoke insertion
right to s1
revoke insertion
right to s1
“abc” “xabc” “xabc”
Figure 2: Divergence caused by introducing administrative operations
The new policy object is not uniformly enforced among all sites because of the out-of-order
execution of administrative and cooperative operations. Thus, security holes may be created. For
instance some sites can accept cooperative operations that are illegal with respect to the new policy
(e.g. sites s1 and s2).
As our objective is to deploy such DCE in a P2P environment, the solution based on enforcing a
total order between both operations is discarded as it would require a central server. Achieving this
objective raises a critical question: how the enforcement of the new policy is performed with respect
to concurrent cooperative operations? It should be noted that this enforcement may be delayed by
either the latency of the network or malicious users.
To solve this problem, we apply the principles of optimistic security [8] in such a way that the
enforcement of the new policy may be retroactive with respect to concurrent cooperative operations.
In this case, only illegal operations are undone. For instance, in Figure 2, Ins(1,x) should be undone
in s1 and s2 after the execution of the revocation.
Second scenario: Suppose now that we use some technique to detect concurrency relations between
administrative and cooperative operations. In the scenario of Figure 3, three users see initially the
same document “abc” and they use the same policy object P =< {s2},{doc},{rD},+ >. Firstly,
adm revokes the deletion right to s2 by removing an authorization from P (P becomes empty).
Concurrently, s2 performs Del(1,a) to obtain the state “bc”. Once the revocation arrives at s2, it
updates the local policy copy and it enforces the new policy by undoing Del(1,a) and restoring the
state to “abc”.
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How to integrate the remote operation Del(1,a) at adm and s1? Before to execute this op-
eration, if we check it directly against the local policy at adm, it will be rejected (the policy is
empty). After a while of receiving and ignoring operation Del(1,a), adm decides to grant once
again the deletion right to s2. At s1, the execution of both administrative operations leads to
P =< {s2},{doc},{rD},+ >. Before to execute Del(1,a), if we check it directly with respect
to the local policy of s1 then it will be granted and its execution will lead to data inconsistency.
This security hole comes from the fact that the generation context of Del(1,a) (the local policy
on which it was checked) at s2 is different from the current execution context at adm and s1 (due to
preceding executions of concurrent administrative operations).
adm
“abc”
s1
“abc”
s2
“abc”
Revoke deletion to s2
++VVV
VVVV
VVV
))SS
SSS
SSS
SSS
SSS
SSS
SSS
SSS
SSS
SSS
Del(1,a)
qqccccccc
ccccccc
ccccccc
ccccccc
c














Ignored Revoke deletion to s2 “bc”
Allow deletion to s2
Revoke deletion to s2
undo(Del(1,a))
Allow deletion to s2
--[[[[[[[
[[[[[[[
[[[[[[
44iiiiiiiiiii
abc
Accepted Allow deletion to s2
“abc” “bc” “abc”
Figure 3: Necessity of admin Log.
Intuitively, our solution consists in capturing the causal relations between cooperative operations
and the policy copies on which they are generated. In other words, every local policy copy maintains
a monotonically increasing counter that is incremented by every administrative operation performed
on this copy. If each granted cooperative operation is associated with the local counter of the policy
object at the time of its creation, then we can correctly integrate it in every remote site. However,
when the cooperative operation’s counter is less than the policy copy’s counter of another site then
this operation need to be checked with respect to preceding concurrent administrative operations
before its execution. Therefore, we propose in our model to store administrative operations in a
log at every site in order to validate the remote cooperative operations at appropriate context. For
instance, in Figure 2, we can deduce that Del(1,a) will be ignored at s1 by simply checking it against
the first revocation.
Third scenario: Using the above solution, the administrative operations will be totally ordered as
only administrator modifies the policy object and we associate to every version of this object a
monotonically increasing counter.
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Consider the scenario illustrated in Figure 4 where s1 is initially authorized to insert any charac-
ter. When adm revokes the insertion right to s1, he has already seen the effect of the s1’s insertion.
If s2 receives the revocation before the insertion, he will ignore this insertion as it is checked against
the revocation. It is clear that the insertion may be delayed at s2 either by the latency of the network
or by a malicious user. We observe that there is a causal relation at adm between the insertion and the
revocation. This causal relation is not respected at s2 and the out-of-execution of operations creates
a security hole as s2 rejects a legal insertion.
adm
“abc”
s1
“abc”
s2
“abc”
Ins(1,x)
8
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
8
vvmmm
mmm
mmm
Accepted “xabc” revoke insertionright to s2
“xabc”
revoke insertion
right to s2
''OO
OOO
O
66llllllllllllllllllll
Ignored
revoke insertion
right to s2
“xabc” “xabc” “abc”
Figure 4: Validation of operations
Before it is received at the administrator site, we consider a cooperative operation as tentative.
So, our solution consists of an additional administrative operation that doesn’t modify the policy
object but increments the local counter. This operation validates each received and accepted cooper-
ative operation at the administrator site. Consequently, every administrative operation is concurrent
to all tentative operations. The policy modifications done after the validation of a cooperative oper-
ation are executed after this operation in all sites, as administrative operations are totally ordered.
In case of our scenario in Figure 4, the revocation received at s2 will not be executed until the
validation of the insertion is received. This avoids blocking legal operations and data divergence.
5 Concurrency Control Algorithm
Now we formally present the different components of our algorithm. We also give its asymptotic
time complexity.
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5.1 Cooperative and Administrative Requests
We define a cooperative request q as a tuple (c,r,a,o,v, f ) where: (i) c is the identity of the collab-
orator site (or the user) issuing the request. (ii) r is its serial number (note that the concatenation of
q.c and q.r is defined as the request identity of q). (iii) a is the identity of the preceding cooperative
request1. If a is null then the request does not depend on any other request. (iv) o is the cooperative
operation (see Definition 3.1) to be executed on the shared state. (v) v is the number version of the
policy copy on which the operation is granted. (vi) f is the kind of cooperative (tentative, valid or
invalid). We consider three kinds of cooperative requests:
1. tentative : when an operation is locally accepted, it is stored as a request waiting for validation
from the administrator.
2. valid : it is generated by a given site and validated by the local policy of the administrator.
3. invalid : this means that it is not confirmed by the receiver local policy. It is then stored in the
log and flagged in order to memorize its reception.
To detect causal dependency and concurrent relations between cooperative requests, we use a
technique proposed in [4] which allows for dynamic groups as it is independent of the number of
users (unlike to vector timestamp-based technique [3]). This technique builds a dependency tree
where each request q has only to store in q.a the request identity whose it directly depends on. For
more details, see [4].
We consider an administrative request r as the triple r = (id,o,v) where: (i) id is the identity of
the administrator; (ii) o is the administrative operation (see Definition 3.3); (iii) v is the last version
number of the policy object. As only administrator specifies authorizations in the policy object, the
administrative requests are totally ordered. Indeed, each policy copy maintains a monotonically in-
creasing counter that is stored (in the version component v) and incremented by every administrative
operation performed on this copy.
As seen in Section 4, it is crucial to correctly deal with the out-of-order execution between co-
operative and administrative requests in order to avoid the security holes. Let q and r be cooperative
and administrative requests respectively: (i) q depends causally on r iff q.v > r.v, i.e. q already has
seen the effect of r; (ii) if q is tentative then it is concurrent to r, i.e. the administrator has not yet
seen the effect of q when it generates r.
5.2 Control Procedure
In our approach, a group consists of one administrator site and N user sites (where N is variable in
time) starting a collaboration session from the same initial document state D0. Each site stores all
cooperative requests in log H and administrative requests (AddAuth and DelAuth) in a log L. Our
concurrency control procedure is given in Algorithm 1. It should be noted that Algorithm 1 is mainly
based on framework proposed in [4]. This framework relies on (i) using OT approach [3] in order
to execute cooperative requests in any order; (ii) using a particular class of logs, called canonical,
where insertion requests are stored before deletion requests in order to ensure data convergence.
1According to the dependency relation described in [4].
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1: Main:
2: INITIALIZATION
3: while not aborted do
4: if there is an input o then
5: if o is cooperative then
6: GENERATE COOP REQUEST
7: else if i = admin then
8: GENERATE ADMIN REQUEST
9: end if
10: else
11: RECEIVE REQUEST
12: RECEIVE COOP REQUEST
13: RECEIVE ADMIN REQUEST
14: end if
15: end while
16: INITIALIZATION:
17: D ← D0 {Actual state of the site}
18: s← Identification of local site
19: version← 0 {Initial Version of local site}
20: H ← [] {Cooperative log}
21: L ← [] {Administrative log}
22: F ← [] {Cooperative requests buffer}
23: Q ← [] {Administrative requests buffer}
24: compteurCoopOp← 0
25: RECEIVE REQUEST:
26: if there is a cooperative request q from a network then
27: F ← F +q
28: end if
29: if there is an administrative request r from a network then
30: Q ← Q+ r
31: end if
Algorithm 1: Control Concurrency Algorithm at the i-th site
Generation of local cooperative request. In Algorithm 2, when an operation o is locally generated,
it is first checked against the local policy object (i.e. using boolean function CHECK LOCAL). If
it is granted locally, it is immediately executed on its generation state (i.e. Do(o,D) computes
the resulting state when executing operation o on state D). Once the request q is formed, it is
considered either as valid when the issuer is the administrator or otherwise as tentative. Function
COMPUTEBF(q,L) is called to detect inside H whether or not q is causally dependent on precedent
cooperative request. Integrating q after H may result in not canonical log. To transform [H;q] in
canonical form, we use function CANONIZE. Finally, the request q′ (the result of COMPUTEBF) is
propagated to all sites in order to be executed on other copies of the shared document. For more
details on functions COMPUTEBF and CANONIZE, see [4].
Reception of cooperative request. Each site has the use of queue F to store the remote requests
coming from other sites. Request q generated on site i is added to F when it arrives at site j (with
i 6= j). In Algorithm 3, to preserve the causality dependency with respect to precedent administrative
requests and precedent cooperative requests, q is extracted from the queue when it is causally-ready
(i.e. q.v ≤ version and the precedent cooperative requests of q have been already integrated on site
j). Using function CHECK REMOTE(q,L), q is checked against the administrative log L to verify
whether or not q is granted. If q is received by the administrator then it is validated and a validation
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1: GENERATE COOP REQUEST:
2: if CHECK LOCAL(o) then
3: D← Do(o,D)
4: compteurCoopOp← compteurCoopOp+1
5: if i = admin then
6: q ← (s,compteurCoopOp,o,null,Valid,version)
7: else
8: q ← (s,compteurCoopOp,o,null,Tentative,version)
9: end if
10: q′ ←COMPUTEBF(q,H)
11: H ← CANONIZE(q′ ,H)
12: broadcast q′;
13: end if
Algorithm 2: Cooperative request generation at a site s
request is generated in order to broadcast it to other sites. Next, function COMPUTEFF(q,L) is called
in order to compute the transformed form q′ to be executed on current state D. This function is given
in [4]. Finally, the transformed form of q, namely q′, is executed on the current state and function
CANONIZE is called in order to turn again [H;q′] in canonical form.
Generation and Reception of administrative request. In Algorithm 4, the policy copy maintains
a version counter that is incremented by the request generated by the administrator and performed
on this copy. This request is next broadcast to other users for enforcing the new policy. When the
received request r is causally ready (i.e. r.v = version + 1 and if r is a validation of a cooperative
request q then this one has been already executed on this site), it is extracted from Q. If r.o is
AddAuth or DelAuth: (i) it is performed on the the policy copy; and, (ii) it undoes the tentative
cooperative request that are no longer granted by the new policy. However, if r is a validation of
cooperative request q then it sets q to valid.
1: RECEIVE COOP REQUEST(q):
2: if q is causally ready then
3: F ← F −q
4: if (CHECK REMOTE(q,L)) then
5: if i = adm then
6: q. f ← valid
7: r ← GENERATE ADMIN REQUEST(Validate(q))
8: end if
9: else
10: q. f ← invalid
11: end if
12: q′ ← COMPUTEFF (q,H)
13: D ← Do(q′,D)
14: CANONIZE(q′ ,H)
15: end if
Algorithm 3: Cooperative request reception by a site s
Asymptotic Time Complexities. Let Hdu be all deletion/update requests H. In the worst
case, when cooperative request q is an insertion and it has no dependency inside H (see [4]):
(i) functions COMPUTEFF(q,H) and COMPUTEBF(q,H) have the same complexity, O(|H|), and;
(ii) the complexity of function CANONIZE(q,H) is O(|Hdu|). Hence, the complexity of GENER-
ATE COOP REQUEST is O(|H|+ |Hdu|+ |Prv|) = O(2 ∗ |H|+ |Prv|) (with Prv is the list of autho-
INRIA
An Optimistic Mandatory Access Control Model for Distributed Collaborative Editors 15
1: GENERATE ADMIN REQUEST:
2: version← version+1
3: apply modification to the policy
4: r ← (admin,version,o)
5: broadcast r;
6: RECEIVE ADMIN REQUEST(r):
7: if r is causally ready then
8: Q← Q− r
9: if (r.o is an AddAuth or DelAuth) then
10: apply modification to policy
11: if r is restrictive then
12: H ← UNDO(q,H) for all tentative request q concerned by the request r
13: end if
14: else
15: j ← GetIndex(r.q) {to determine the index of the cooperative request to validate it}
16: H [ j]. f ← valid
17: end if
18: version← version+1
19: end if
Algorithm 4: Generation and reception of administrative request
rizations at version v), and the complexity of RECEIVE COOP REQUEST is O(|L|+ |H|+ |Hdu|) =
O(|L|+2∗|H|) (where L is the administrative log). Consequently, our concurrency control algorithm
is not expensive and scale well as all functions have a linear behaviour.
However, to enforce the new authorization policy we have used the function UNDO(q,H). The
complexity of this function is O(|H|2) when all H’s requests are tentative and they should be undone
by request r. Practically, UNDO is not expensive if we assume that the transmission time of requests
is very short. In this case, the most of tentative requests will be validated by the administrator and
there will be fewer requests to undo between two version of the policy object.
5.3 Illustrative Example
To highlight the feature of our concurrency control algorithm, we present a slightly complicated
scenario in Figure 5, where the solid (dotted) arrows describe the integration order (validation of
tentative requests). We have an administrator adm and two users s1 and s2 starting the collaboration
with the initial state D0 = ‘‘abc” and the initial policy version (v0i = v0) characterized by the policy
P0i =< (All,Doc,{iR,dR,rR,uR},+) > (for i = adm,1,2). The notations All and Doc designate the
set of all users and the whole document respectively. Initially, the cooperative and administrative
logs of each site are empty (H0i = L0i = [] for i = adm,1,2).
They generate three concurrent cooperative requests respectively: q0.o = Ins(2,y), q1.o =
Del(2,b) and q2.o = Ins(3,x). After integrating q0, q1 and q2, s1 generates q3.o = Del(1,a). As
for s2, it generates q4.o = Del(1,a) after the integration of q1 and q2. Finally adm generates the
administrative request r.o = AddAuth(1,(s1,Doc,dR,−)). At the end of the collaboration, the three
sites will converge to the final state ”ayc”.
We describe the integration of our requests in three steps:
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Figure 5: Collaboration scenario between an administrator and two sites.
Step 1. At adm, the execution of q0 produces D10 = ”aybc” and H10 = [q0]. When q2 and q1 arrive,
they are transformed by COMPUTEFF(). This results in D30 = ayxc and H30 = [q0;q′2;q′1] with q′2.o =
Ins(4,x) and q′1.o = Del(4,b). These requests are validated and sent to s1 and s2.
At s1, the execution of q1 gives D11 = ”ac” and H11 = [q1]. Once received and granted by the
local policy, q2 and q0 are transformed and the obtained log is twice modified by CANONIZE()
as insertions must appear before deletions. We get D31 = ”ayxc” and H31 = [q2;q0;q′1] with q′1.o =
Del(3,b). Executing q2 and q1 at s2 produces D22 = ”axc” and H22 = [q2;q1].
The sites adm, s1 and s2 generate r, q3 and q4 respectively. They are propagated as follows.
Step 2. At adm site, r is restrictive and it produces P10 =<
(s1,Doc,dR,−),(All,Doc,{iR,dR,rR,uR},+) >, L10 = [r] and v10 = v0 + 1. Indeed, it revokes the
deletion right to s1.
At s1, the execution of q3 after H31 results in D41 = ”yxc”. To broadcast q3 with a minimal
generation context, function COMPUTEBF() is called to detect causal dependency inside H31 . The
obtained log is H41 = [q2;q0;q′1,q3].
At s2, q4 is executed after H22 and produces D32 = ”ac” H32 = [q2;q1;q4]. Using COMPUTEBF()
enables to detect that q4 depends on q2, as q4 removes the character inserted by q2. When q0
arrives, its integration produces D42 = ”ayc” and H42 = [q2;q0;q′′1 ;q′′4] (with q′′1.o = Del(3,b) and
q′′4.o = Del(3,x)). This log is the result of CANONIZE().
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Step 3. At adm, when q3 is checked against L10 it is rejected but is stored in invalid form q∗3 which
has no effect on the local document state. The resulting log is H50 = [q0;q′2;q′1,q∗3]. When q4 arrives,
it is only transformed against q′1 and q∗3 as it depends on q′2. This results in D60 = ”ayc” and H60 =
[q0;q′2;q
′
1,q
∗
3,q
′
4] with q′4.o = Del(3,x).
At s1, the integration of q4 produces D51 = ”yc” and H51 = [q2;q0;q′1;q3;q4]. Integrating r results
in L11 = [r] and v11 = v0 + 1. Enforcing the new policy requires to undo q3 as it is a tentative (not
validated yet) request. The inverse of q3, noted q3, is firstly generated with q3.o = Ins(1,a). Next,
q3 is transformed against q4 giving q3′ of which the execution results in D61 = “ayc′′. Finally the log
is modified to H61 = [q2;q0;q′1;q3;q3;q′4] where q′4 is the form of q4 as if q3 hasn’t been executed.
At s2, the reception of r results in L21 = [r] and v21 = v0 + 1. Request q3 is invalidated (q3. f =
invalid) and stored in log without being executed. This results in H52 = [q2;q0;q′1;q4;q∗3].
6 Implementation and Evaluation
A prototype of DCE based on our optimistic MAC has been implemented in Java. It supports the
collaborative editing of HTML pages and it is deployed on P2P JXTA platform (see Figure 6). In
our prototype, a user can create a HTML page from scratch by opening a new collaboration group.
Thus, he is the administrator of this group. Others users may join the group to participate in HTML
page editing, as they may leave this group at any time. The administrator can dynamically add
and remove different authorizations for accessing to the shared document according the contribution
and the competence of users participating in the group. Using JXTA platform, users exchange their
operations in real-time in order to support WYSIWIS (What You See Is What I See) principle.
Experiments are necessary to understand what the asymptotic complexities mean when interac-
tive constraints are present in the system. For our evaluation performance, we consider the follow-
ing times: (i) t1 is the execution time of Generate Coop request(); (ii) t2 is the execution time of
Receive Coop request(). We assume that the transmission time between sites is negligible. In gen-
eral, it is established that the OT-based DCE must provide t1 +t2 < 100ms [6]. Both algorithms 2 and
3 call function CANONIZE, their performances are mostly determined by the percentage of insertion
requests inside the log. The management of the policy may affect the performance of the system
since, in Algorithms 2 and 3, we have to explore either the policy or the the administrative log which
are edited by the administrator. In our experiments we suppose that the policy is not optimized (i.e.
it contains authorization redundancies).
Figure 7 shows three experiments2 with different percentages of insertions inside log H. These
measurements reflects the times t1, t2 and their sum. The execution time falls within 100ms for all
|H| ≤ 5000 if H contains 0% INS, |H| ≤ 9000 if H contains 100% INS which is not achieved in
SDT and ABT algorithms [6].
2The experiments have been performed under Ubunto Linux kernel 2.6.24-19 with an Intel Pentium-4 2.60 GHz CPU and
768 Mo RAM.
RR n° 6939
18 A. Imine et al.
Figure 6: p2pEdit tool
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new framework for controlling access in collaborative editing
work. It is based on MAC and optimistic replication of the shared document and its authorization
policy. We have shown how naive coordination between updates of both copies may create security
holes. Finally, we have provided some performance evaluations to show the applicability of our
MAC model distributed collaborative editing.
In future work, we intend to investigate the impact of our work when using delegation of adminis-
trative requests between the group users. As the length of local (administrative and cooperative) logs
increases rapidly during collaboration sessions, we plan to address the garbage collection problem.
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Figure 7: Time processing of Insert Requests.
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